Kashmir Conflict: An Indian Perspective

This post is a follow-up to https://tikoo-talk.com/an-overview-of-the-Kashmir-conflict/.

Here, I will engage in a cost-based discussion of the Kashmir conflict.

What costs have India and Pakistan incurred?

Both countries have incurred high per capita defense expenditures and comparable costs fighting multiple wars.

Pakistan’s direct cost of sponsoring insurgency in Kashmir is modest compared with India’s enormous counterinsurgency cost.

Over the years, India has invested considerable resources, regardless of economic return, in the development of Kashmir.

In the eyes of some, India has depleted its moral capital in defending its Kashmir position.

What costs will India and Pakistan incur going forward?

I will consider the costs related to India and Pakistan’s boundary options only.

1. India maintains that Kashmir is its integral part.

Besides the huge economic burden of this option, does India also bear a moral cost?

India did not annex Kashmir by force. Nehru was anything but an annexationist Hindu zealot. Moreover, Kashmir’s accession was handled not by some trigger-happy Hindu but by Mountbatten, a holdover British administrator. Unquestionably, India followed procedural due process regarding Kashmir’s accession.

But legality and morality do not always overlap. While legally Kashmir is part of India, is India morally right in retaining Kashmir, given that most Kashmiri Muslims detest India? Their hearts beat for Pakistan or independence, not for India. Given this context, how should India act?

Nations act in the national interest. That is what they do; otherwise, they might cease to exist. India too must act in its national interest.

However, the pursuit of national interest is often at odds with morality, especially when viewed from the moral lenses of individuals.

To me, the morality of nations is a fuzzy notion. Quicksand, if you will. Accordingly, I will comment on the morality issue from an individual perspective.

By a complex twist of circumstances, an odd mix of right and wrong at the same time, Kashmiri Muslims are part of India and not Pakistan. Given this base case, the determinant question is how have they fared in India?

Specifically, have they faced economic or religious persecution? The answer is a resounding NO. On the contrary, the Kashmir Valley has been pampered and subsidized economically by the Indian State. In the Kashmir Valley, you will not see the abject poverty and malnourishment that you get to see in large swaths of India. Kashmiris practice Islam as freely as they would have in Pakistan or any other Islamic nation.

Then why do Kashmiri Muslims detest India? It is all about religious affiliation. Nothing more nothing less. For most Kashmiri Muslims, Pakistan is a personification of Islamic brotherhood. India, on the other hand, is a land of murderous Hindus.

Is it right to support secession based solely on religious affiliation? I do not think so.

I believe progressive thought must vigorously oppose territorial division based on race, religion, and language. The century of demographics-based slicing of nations is behind us.

2. India lets Kashmir separate/accede to Pakistan

India might enjoy a significant peace dividend. The potential upside, however, pales in comparison to the downside.

India will lose the defense advantage of a rugged mountainous border to its North.

The formation of the Indian Union from diverse princely states and linguistic regions was the singular achievement of the first couple of decades of independent India. The separation of Kashmir will create a domino effect that will strain the Union in multiple territories.

If India lets Kashmir separate, it will vindicate Pakistan’s cross-border terrorism policy and encourage Pakistan to foment trouble in Punjab, where Pakistan has a history of abetting separatism.

An action that could trigger religion-based fracturing of the Indian Union has an incalculable cost for secular India, with the third-largest Muslim population in the world and multiple territories where minority religions are the majority. The Indian State will shun such action.

3. Pakistan maintains its existing position

Pakistan has a comparatively modest direct financial cost of sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir. It has also mostly escaped costly negative sanctions for breeding terrorism. Its existing Kashmir policy has generated tremendous returns compared to the returns from resorting to direct military conflict. Thus, Pakistan has an incentive to persist with its current policy.

But it is slowly becoming apparent that Pakistan’s engagement with terror has an insidious indirect cost. State sponsorship of terrorism is vitiating Pakistan’s internal environment, including its economy.

It is probably not a mere correlation that Pakistan’s economic slide parallels making terrorism an instrument of state policy.

It is difficult for Pakistan to be a terror factory and a widget factory simultaneously. Eventually, it must choose one over the other. And the choice is clear.

Pakistan’s current policy has tormented and tested India like never before. This policy, however, is a double-edged sword. The effectiveness of this policy has pushed India further down the path of no return regarding Kashmir. India would be ill-advised to change its non-negotiable stand on Kashmir in response to pressure from cross-border terrorism.

4. Pakistan accepts the status quo  

The status quo is that India has a little more than half of the original princely J&K state, Pakistan has one-third, and China has the rest. And it remains that way.

The Kashmir Valley was never part of Pakistan. In accepting the status quo, Pakistan does not cede any territory.

If Pakistan scales down on the Kashmir issue, I do not expect widespread public backlash. I do not believe Pakistanis are waiting anxiously for Kashmir to join their country. Pakistan without Kashmir does not negatively impact the average Pakistani.

Pakistan does not have to enter a formal agreement with India to cement the status quo. External agreements tend to galvanize opposition political parties as well as public opinion. Pakistan can gradually reduce its Kashmir involvement without a formal agreement.

Pakistan reducing its Kashmir involvement will negatively impact two key stakeholders: the religious right and its associated terror outfits and the all-powerful Pakistan Army.

The Army has directly or indirectly ruled Pakistan all along. Pakistan’s civilian prime ministers serve at the pleasure of the Army. Without the Army’s blessings, Pakistan’s Kashmir policy will not change. And if the Army was to come on board, then managing the pushback from the religious right will not be a problem.

What should Pakistan do?

India has incurred a higher Kashmir-related cost in the past than Pakistan and faces a much higher burden of reversing its Kashmir position than Pakistan. Consequently, Pakistan should not expect India to blink. The lowest cost option is for Pakistan to accept the status quo.

I believe India would have accepted the status quo had it been in Pakistan’s situation.

Consider a hypothetical situation wherein a Muslim ruler of a Hindu-majority Kashmir had acceded to Pakistan, a secular democracy. India, like Pakistan, would have pulled all stops to bring Kashmir into its fold.

Assuming India was unsuccessful in reversing the accession of Kashmir in the first few years post-partition, what would India have done? I do not think that 75 years later, India would have Kashmir as a top priority and resort to extensive cross-border terrorism to settle the Kashmir issue. India would have made some occasional noise but would have reconciled to reality. Pakistan should do the same.

Nations Flourish and Wither by the Decisions of their Leaders

Political leaders shape the destinies of their countries. Most Pakistanis are eternally grateful to Jinnah for the gift of a separate Muslim nation. They must also live with the consequences of his miscalculations.  

Jinnah made wrong calls regarding the accession of princely states, the tribal invasion of Kashmir, and a plebiscite proposal. He could not have asked for a better Indian counterpart than Nehru for getting Kashmir into Pakistan’s fold. Despite the deck stacked in his favor, Jinnah messed up.

By the early 1950s, when plebiscite discussions stopped, the die was cast on the Kashmir issue.

Unfortunately, Pakistan refuses to accept the reality. To embrace the reality of Kashmir and end its self-destructive Kashmir obsession, Pakistan needs a leader with significant military and political clout. Pakistan needs its Anwar Sadat.

I have long been waiting for Pakistan to get a leader who will put this region firmly on the path to peace. I hope it happens in my lifetime.

 

Notes

My Kashmir background: I was born to Kashmiri parents in Srinagar, where I grew to be a two-year-old. I attended third and fourth grade and four years of high school in Srinagar. My high school was a one-hour commute by inter-city bus from the small hamlet outside Srinagar, where my family lived. The bus passengers used to be from a broad cross-section of Kashmiri society. The many incidents and conversations I experienced on the bus rides were my passport to the Kashmiri mindset.

Ideally, India and Pakistan should sort this issue, intractable for 75 years, with a blank slate. For instance, many Indians say we will not let the sacrifice of our soldiers who died for Kashmir go in vain. By saying so, we commit ourselves to a position based on past investments and undervalue other options. To ignore non-recoverable costs is rational but hard to practice. Even professional managers find it hard to ignore sunk costs in business decisions. So, while ideal, it is near impossible for India and Pakistan to ignore their past investments and start afresh.

The Kashmir insurgency is not organic and would not have taken off and thrived without Pakistan’s active involvement. Although Kashmiri Muslims had no love for India, they had no pressing motivation to engage in any prolonged secessionist movement. They led a reasonably good life and did not face discrimination or persecution. Fringe-radical elements did not have widespread acceptance, especially when the wildly popular Sheikh Abdullah was chief minister.

When I say that Kashmiri Muslims have fared well in India, I refer to the time before the insurgency, which began in the late-1980s. The last three decades have been hard on all associated with Kashmir—Hindus, militants, security forces, and the average Muslim.  The security forces have had to fight a high-stress guerilla war in which the locals supported the militants. In fighting this war, the security forces have sometimes used harsh measures that have alienated the local population. The daily life environment was very restrictive during periods of heightened insurgency.  More recently, the abrogation of Article 370 came with a stringent clampdown on cellular and internet access.

The good news is that there is considerable normalcy now. Currently, Kashmir is probably better than it ever has been since 1990. Ironically, the increased militarization of the Valley has pumped the local economy through defense spending and personal consumption of the security personnel.

Kashmiri Muslims have always let religious identity and solidarity transcend national identity. With this mindset, they have wrought woe upon themselves.

Ayub Khan received flak for the Tashkent Agreement and Zulfikar Bhutto for the Simla Agreement. These agreements were signed in the aftermath of wars when emotions were on a boil. An agreement on Kashmir outside of a post-war setting is likely to be more palatable. In any case, there is no need for an agreement to manage the Kashmir issue. No one needs to bell the cat explicitly.

For many years, Pakistan’s per capita GDP was higher than that of India. However, during the past two decades, Pakistan’s per capita GDP has significantly lagged that of India.  The gap will widen in the future. I wish this relative economic slide bothered Pakistan more than Kashmir. The Kashmir obsession will worsen Pakistan’s economic decline.

Comparative Per Capita GDP (USD)

Year	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2019	2020
India	82	112	267	368	443	1,358	2,152	1,901
Pakistan	83	172	303	372	576	987	1,185	1,194

Source: https://www.macrotrends.net/